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Abstract 
 
Audit committee financial expertise is vital to the quality of financial reporting. This study empirically investigates the impact of 
audit committee financial expertise on the quality of financial reporting. The financial reporting quality was measured by 
reliability (total accrual quality) and relevance (audit report lag). Fifteen money deposit banks were selected and data was 
collected for the period (2003-2012). Analyses were carried out using Correlation, Ordinary Least Square and Panel Lest 
Square. The study found, after controlling for firm size, audit type, age of firm, audit committee meeting and audit committee 
size, that, audit committee financial expertise showed a negative coefficient for total accrual quality and audit report lag. This 
means financial expertise has a positive significant impact on financial reporting quality in Nigeria. The study, therefore, 
recommends that more attention should be given to the financial expertise of directors being recommended to the audit 
committee.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Audit committees, as corporate governance mechanisms play central role in the financial monitoring of firms and also 
provide oversight roles over accounting policies and judgments, as well as on the quality of the overall financial 
statements (Kevin, 2009; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Security and Exchange Commission Code (SEC), 2011). 
However, the audit committees in Nigeria especially in the banking sector (which is the most regulated sector in Nigeria) 
have not been seen to have demonstrated enough capacity as a result of financial scandals that often been experienced 
in the sector. According to Ojeka, Iyoha and Obigbemi (2014), the series of events had serious devastating effect on 
stakeholders in terms of losses in their investments. Therefore, the trust which investors had on the credibility of the 
report presented by the management of companies could no longer be sustained. As a result, regulators have been 
increasingly concerned about the effectiveness of audit committees in monitoring corporate financial reporting in the 
Nigerian banking sector. Thus, there has been agitation by various stakeholders for the review of corporate governance 
structures and mechanisms of which the audit committees stand as the most important mechanism (Owolabi and 
Ogbechie, 2010). 
Following the agitations to review the structures of corporate governance in Nigeria and in view of the importance 
attached to the institution of effective corporate governance, the Federal Government of Nigeria, through regulatory 
agencies have come up with institutional arrangements to protect investors in Nigeria (Kajola, 2008). The first attempt to 
provide for audit committee effectiveness was contained in Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) CAP C20, Law of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria (LFN) 2004 Sec. 359. The second attempt was contained in the Code of Corporate 
Governance best practices issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in November, 2003. These two 
provisions failed to address the issue of audit committees in terms of financial expertise and hence failed to ensure 
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quality financial reporting. The failure resulted in incessant reports that bordered on financial misappropriations which led 
to the removal of CEOs in some Nigerian banks (Ojeka, Kanu and Owolabi, 2013).  
This, therefore, necessitated the apex Capital Market regulator (the Security and Exchange Commission) to review 
the Code of Corporate Governance to enhance the effectiveness of audit committees (Egwuatu, 2010). The extant SEC 
Code which came into operation in 2011 requires the audit committee of the board to ensure the constitution of a suitably 
skilled committee with members possessing basic financial literacy and the ability to read financial statements (KPMG, 
2011). To this end, the Code provides that at least one of the members of the audit committee should have knowledge of 
accounting or financial management (SEC Code, 2011). The question that arises from the above position is whether the 
provisions for audit committee financial expertise can assist audit committees in ensuring quality financial reporting.  
Although a few empirical studies have been undertaken on audit committee effectiveness and financial 
performance in the context of developing nations (see Mohammed & Oladele, 2008; Owolabi, et al., 2010; Ofo, 2010; 
Adelopo, 2010; Ojeka, Kanu & Owolabi, 2013; Uwuigbe, 2013; Ojeka, Iyoha & Obigbemi, 2014), none of these studies 
considered audit committee financial expertise as a useful resource in the audit committee assignment. The objective of 
this paper, therefore, is to evaluate the influence of audit committee financial expertise on the quality financial report 
within the banking sector in Nigeria.  
The rest of the paper is structured into four parts. Part 2 discusses the literature and hypothesis development and 
part 3, the methodology. Part 4 discusses the analysis and implications of findings while part 5 is the conclusion and 
recommendations. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
The audit committee plays a central role in the financial monitoring of a firm (Kevin, 2009). It also acts in a manner that 
will provide oversight roles over accounting policies and judgments, as well as the quality of the overall financial 
statements (Blue Ribbon Committee (1999); Security and Exchange Commission Code (SEC), 2011). The SEC (2011) 
maintained that, to carry out the assigned tasks of monitoring financial reporting diligently, it will require significant 
accounting sophistication. That is, it would involve assessing the reasonableness of complex financial matters such as 
the company's accounting reserves, and management's handling of proposed audit adjustments suggested by the 
external auditors (DeFond, Hann, & Hu, 2005). Audit committee is one mechanism available to the board of directors to 
limit conflicts of interest between managers and stockholders (Menon & William, 1994). The wide adoption of the 
formation of audit committees around the world suggests the importance of an audit committee as a governance 
mechanism (Saidin, 2007). According to Cadbury Report (1992), audit committees would be important governance 
mechanisms that would protect the interests of the shareholders and ensure transparent reporting and improve audit 
quality. 
This committee consists of three shareholders’ representatives and three independent non-executive directors as 
spelt out in Nigeria’s Company and Allied Matters Act (2004) with at least one qualifying as a financial expert (Sarbanes 
Oxley Act, 2002; Security and Exchange Commission Code, 2003). The membership of an audit committee, particularly 
the characteristics of its members, has been viewed as a determinant of audit committee effectiveness (Lindsell, 1992; 
Kalbers & Fogarty, 1993; DeZoort, 1998).  
According to DeZoort and Salterio (2001), the effectiveness of an audit committee is likely to be affected by its 
members’ collective characteristics of being qualified and well informed, with a majority of independent members who 
meet frequently and have the authority to protect stakeholder interests through their diligent oversight efforts. This is 
where the audit committee financial expertise comes in. However, the audit committee has not shown the required ability 
to be able to provide the required financial oversight as evident in the financial recession, experienced especially in the 
Nigerian banking sector which led to the removal of some bank CEOs.  
This scenario led to the criticisms of the audit committee for their inability to perform the oversight function over the 
company’s financial activities properly. The question therefore, is that, can the audit committee give what they don’t 
have?. Nigeria, as a developing country, has not demonstrated enough drive to empower the audit committee in what is 
needed to perform credibly especially in the banking sector which is the most regulated sector. The financial expertise of 
the audit committee in Nigeria has left much to be desired. It would appear that much emphasis has been placed on the 
‘politics’ of appointment into the committee rather than on the skill and financial expertise of the individuals until the 2011 
SEC Code. This supports the assertion of Okpara (2000) that board members are picked from the pool of high-profiled 
retired senior military officers and civil servants without expertise in basic finance and business operations.  
The major stock exchanges in the world, for instance the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), National Association 
of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) now require that 
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audit committee members be able to read and understand financial statement (Bill, 2006). Adesiyan (2010) argued that, 
access can only be gained to what the executive directors provide. Therefore, the need to have an audit committee with 
financial expertise cannot be over-emphasized. As noted in extant literature, for instance, Abbott, Parker and Peters 
(2004); Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan (2003); Farber (2005); Carcello and Neal (2003), DeFond, et al., 
(2005), Lee et al. (2004); Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) and Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi, (2007) document lower 
instances of earnings restatements, higher demand for audit services and lower occurrence of financial fraud in firms with 
financial expertise in audit committees. Based on the foregoing, the following hypothesis is proposed- 
H0 Audit committee financial expertise has no significant impact on the quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian 
banking sector. 
 
3. Research Methods 
 
The focus of the study is on the money-deposit banks in Nigeria. The population of the study comprises the 18 listed 
banks on the Nigerian Stock Exchange between the period of 2003-2011. However, the sample is made up banks that 
were listed and active on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (between January, 2003 and December, 2011). As a result, 15 
firms were selected based on the availability of the financial statements.  
For the purpose of testing the hypotheses stated, the use of Panel Least Square i.e. Least Square Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) was used. The study also pooled the time series and cross sectional data in testing the hypothesis 
stated using the OLS regression. In addition, the quality of financial reporting was decomposed into ‘relevance’ and 
‘reliability’. ‘Relevance’ was measured by calculating interval of days between the balance sheet closing date and the 
signed date of the auditor’s report stated in the annual report ( Iyoha, 2010). The second quality of financial reporting is 
‘Reliability’ which is proxied by accrual quality. Schipper (1989); Burilovich and Kattelus (1997) posited that, accounting 
accruals remains the favored instrument for earning management because they are easy for the management to 
manipulate. 
The accrual quality is calculated by adopting the formula used by (Bhattacharya, Daouk & Welker 2003; Leuz, 
Nandan & Wysocki, 2003; Iyoha, 2010). The total accrual method adopted by these studies has been argued by 
McNicholas (2000) as flexible and allows for control of corporate governance and external audit attributes as additional 
variables. Therefore, a positive index of accrual quality suggests that the firm is engaging in income decreasing strategies 
and a negative accrual index indicates income increasing strategies. That is, the higher the index of accruals, the poorer 
the quality of financial reporting and the closer the index to zero, the better is the quality of financial reporting. 
 
Table 3.1: Variables’ Measurement/Description 
 
Names of Variables Acronym Measurement  
Dependent Variables
Reliability (Total Accrual 
Quality) TAQ See Appendix 
Relevance (Audit Report Lag) ADLAG Interval of days between the balance sheet closing date and the signed date of the auditor’s report stated in the annual report 
Independent Variables
Audit Committee Financial 
Expertise FEXP 
The number of individuals on the audit committee who are experienced in 
financially literate 
Control Variables 
Audit Committee Size ACSIZE Whether the audit committee has three or more members
Firm Size FMSIZE This is measured as the book value of the total asset of the firm at the end of financial year 
Audit Committee Meetings ACMT Whether the audit committee meets at least 4 times annually 
Firm Age FAGE This is measured as the number of years the company has been publicly traded 
Audit Type AUDTYP Type of auditor the firm is engaging
 
Adapted from Ojeka, Iyoha and Obigbemi (2014) 
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Model Specification 
To achieve the objective of this study, the following mathematical equations were developed to investigate the 
influence of audit committee financial expertise on the quality of financial report in the Nigerian banking. 
ADLAG = f (FEXP, ACSIZE, ACMT, FMSIZE, FAGE, AUDTYP)………………..………..…….. (1) 
TAQ = f (FEXP, ACSIZE, ACMT, FMSIZE, FAGE, AUDTYP)…………………….……………... (2) 
Models 1 and 2 can now be stated explicitly in the following form: 
ADLAGit = Ȝ0+Ȝ1FEXPit+Ȝ2ACSIZEit +Ȝ3ACMTit+Ȝ4FMSIZEit +Ȝ5FMAGEit+Ȝ6AUDTYPit +μit …… (3) 
TAQit = ȕ0 +ȕ1FEXPit+ȕ2ACSIZEit +ȕ3ACMTit+ȕ4FMSIZEit +ȕ5FMAGEit +ȕ6AUDTYPit +μit ……  (4)  
Using LSDV (Panel Data Estimation), equation 3 in model A above becomes: 
ADLAGit= Ȝ0+ Ȝ1FEXPit+ Ȝ2ACSIZEit + Ȝ3ACMTit+ Ȝ4FMSIZEit + Ȝ5FMAGEit + Ȝ6AUDTYPit + Q1ࣅ1+ Q2ࣅ2+…+ Qj-1ࣅn-
1+μit             (5) 
and equation 4 in model A above also becomes: 
TAQit = ȕ0 + ȕ1FEXPit+ ȕ2ACSIZEit + ȕ3ACMTit+ ȕ4FMSIZEit + ȕ5FMAGEit + ȕ6AUDTYPit + Q1ࣅ1+ Q2ࣅ2+…+ Qj-1ࣅn-
1+μit              (6) 
Where j= n = 18 
The parameters of the model are such that: 
ȕ1, ȕ2 …………………. ȕ6 > 0; ȕ7 < 0 
Į1, Į2 …………………. Į6 > 0; Į7 < 0 
and 
Q1, Q2 …………………. Q6 > 0; Q7 < 0 
i = 1, 2 …… 18 and t = 1, 2 ……10 (2003-2011) 
 
4. Analysis and Presentation of Results 
 
This section shows the results descriptive statistics. The hypothesis was tested using ordinary least square (OLS) and the 
Panel data analysis. 
 
5. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4.01: Banks Sampled 
 
Banks No of years sampled Years of Observation
Access 9 2003-2011
Diamond 9 2003-2011
ECO 9 2003-2011
FCMB 6 2006-2011
First Bank 9 2003-2011
Fidelity 9 2003-2011
GTB 9 2003-2011
Skye 6 2006-2011
Stanbic IBTC 9 2003-2011
Sterling 6 2006-2011
UBA 9 2003-2011
Union 9 2003-2011
Unity 6 2006-2011
Wema 9 2003-2011
Zenith 9 2003-2011
TOTAL 123 2003-2011
Source: Field Study (2013) 
 
The table above shows that out of the population, only 4 banks had a sample of six years while others had a sample of 
nine years. The affected banks with uncompleted financial reports undertook mergers and acquisitions between 2003 and 
2011. Hence, completed financial reports could not be found. 
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Table 4.02: Descriptive Statistics for the Population 
 
Variables Mean Max. Min Std.Dev P.value 
Dependent:  
ADLAG 91.36585 304 14 54.47247 0.00000 
TAQ -0.0173 0.953806 -2.47251 0.289498 0.00000 
Independent:  
FIN. EXPERTISE 0.780488 1 0.333333 0.199404 0.13386 
Control Variables:  
AGE 35.85366 117 11 30.65452 0.00051 
AUD_MT 0.617886 1 0 0.487892 0.00031 
AUD_SIZE 5.788618 6 4 0.547004 0.00000 
AUD_TYP 0.97561 1 0 0.154888 0.00000 
FIRM SIZE 543153.5 2463543 21603 518574.8 0.04038 
OBSERVATIONS 123 123 123 123  
Source: Field Survey (2014) 
 
The table above shows the descriptive statistics for the population (Banking sector). It shows that on the average the 
reporting lag for the banks in the sector stands at 91 days, minimum reporting days in the sector stood at 14 days which 
could be attributed to Zenith Bank and the maximum in the sector stood at 304 says which could be attribute to Wema 
Bank. It also shows that audit committee meeting is held frequently i.e. at least every quarter (0.6). Audit size for the 
banks stands at 6 and the major auditors of the banks are amongst the Big Four (0.9), the Big 4 auditing firms audited 
approximately 98% of the sample banks. In addition, accrual quality among these banks was negatively signed to indicate 
an income increasing strategy. The respective standard deviations also confirm that the number of reporting days is 
widely dispersed. All the variables i.e. dependent, independent and control variables were all significant at 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. 
 
Table 4.03: Relevance (Reporting days) of Financial Reporting by Banks Sampled 
 
Banks Mean Std. Deviation
Access 62.1111 24.22006
Diamond 83.3333 24.2384
ECO 113.8889 38.11314
FCMB 110.1667 23.92001
Fidelity 82.2222 21.60311
First 87.6667 6.98212
GTB 43.1111 32.84983
Skye 102 60.69596
Stanbic IBTC 69 35.84341
Sterling 117.3333 30.34249
UBA 59.2222 25.49401
Unity 137.3333 79.06369
Union 123.3333 42.05948
Wema 182 82.93823
Zenith 31.5556 19.70477
Source: Field Survey (2014) 
 
Table (4.03) showed the reporting lag in days of the population sample (15 banks) in this study. The minimum number of 
reporting lag days recorded in the banking sector was Zenith bank (14 days) while the longest number of days is 
recorded by Wema Bank. Quite a number of the banks within (2003-2011) released its financial report early compared to 
other banks but still were unable to sustain such standards for example, Access Bank. In general on the average, almost 
all the banks were able to meet the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) stipulated time of 90 days and BOFIA 
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statutory reporting date of 120 days except for Unity bank and Wema Bank. Zenith Bank has the lowest mean rate 
followed by GT Bank and the longest is recorded by WEMA Bank. The respective standard deviations also confirm that 
the number of reporting lag days is widely dispersed. 
 
Table 4.04: Accrual Quality by Banks Sampled 
 
Variables Mean Std. Dev.
Access 0.038725564 0.078884
Diamond -0.01158999 0.030577
ECO 0.08725166 0.150425
Fcmb 0.088934902 0.149351
Fidelity 0.000678792 0.040913
First 0.00920971 0.02698
GTB 0.011350174 0.037131
Skye -0.00959967 0.031075
Stanbic IBTC -0.25965129 0.830402
Sterling 0.003635555 0.014196
UBA -0.13899607 0.290373
Union -0.0451395 0.583981
Unity 0.02734439 0.059879
Wema -0.00378739 0.011485
Zenith 0.001991674 0.007217
Source: Field Survey (2014) 
 
Table 4.04 gives the accrual quality of the sampled banks. The indicators demonstrate that some banks engage in 
earnings management and losses management in one form or the other. The mean accrual manipulations are 0.04, -
0.01, 0.09, 0.09, 0.00, 0.01, 0.01, -0.01, -0.25, 0.00, -0.14, -0.05, 0.03, -0.01, 0.00 for all the banks respectively. The 
minimum range showed negative sign for all the banks sampled that is, at one point in time within (2003-2011) all the 
banks engaged in income increasing strategy. This could be the impact of 17 – man committee set up by Atedo Peterside 
in the year 2000 to identify the weaknesses of corporate governance practices with respect to public companies. In 
summary, the manipulations as revealed by statistics are income increasing and income decreasing effects because the 
signs of the indices are both negative and positive. 
 
Table 4.05: Correlation Test for Independent variables 
 
 AGE ACMT AC-SIZE AUD-TYP FEXP F.SIZE 
AGE 1   
ACMT -.350** 1  0.000  
AC_SIZE .214* 0.033 1  0.018 0.719  
AUD_TYP 0.04 .201* -0.061 1  0.662 0.026 0.5  
FEXP 0.052 0.114 .222* .356** 1  0.568 0.21 0.013 0.000  
FMSIZE 
 
.344** 0.091 .270** 0.007 0.093 1 
0.000 0.318 0.003 0.94 0.305  
Key: **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Key: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level & 0.1 level (2-tailed)
Source: Field Survey (2014) 
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Table 4.05 shows the Pearson Correlation results. The results indicate that quite a number of the variables are significant 
1%, 5% and 10% based on the Pearson’s statistic. The correlation amongst the variables is not as high as 0.8. This 
indicates that there is no presence of multi-collinearity amongst the variables since no correlation coefficient is greater 
than 0.9. According to Gujarati and Porter (2009); Hair, Black, Babin and Anderson (2010) posited 0.8 as the threshold at 
which multicollinearity concerns can be harmful to the regression analysis and make the reliability or the positive power of 
the model reduced.  
 
6. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4.06: Regression Results: Whole Sample 
 
  Financial Reporting Quality Measurements  
 1 2 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign 
Reliability (TAQ) Relevance (ADLAG) 
Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-statistics) (t-statistics) 
P-value P-value 
ACFEXP - 
-0.0363**
(-1.79) 
0.075 
-12.584* 
(-4.4933) 
0.062 
Control Variables
ACSIZE - 
-0.0175*
(-1.52) 
0.100 
2.70564 
(0.296) 
0.767 
ACMT - 
0.0259***
(2.66) 
0.0087 
23.0703** 
(2.16) 
0.032 
FAGE - 
0.0114*
(1.65) 
0.100 
37.8781*** 
(4.76) 
0.000 
FSIZE - 
-0.0082***
(-2.49) 
0.014 
-13.6053*** 
(-3.01) 
0.003 
AUDTYP - 
-0.0062
(-0.740) 
0.460) 
-14.9113 
(-0.45) 
0.615 
Constant ? 
0.1900**
(2.12) 
0.035 
133.2224** 
(1.88) 
0.061 
P-value
F-test 
R2 
R2 Adjusted 
No of Obs. 
 
0.1066
1.558 
0.074 
0.027 
123 
0.000 
4.213 
0.179 
0.136 
123 
Keys: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Note: Numbers in each cell are arranged in the following order- Coefficient, t-values (in parenthesis), P-values and Std ȕ 
 
Source: Field Survey (2014) 
 
The table 4.06 explain the overall model as valuable and helpful because the F statistics is significant in the equation. 
The F. Statistics is 4.2133 and 1.558 for timeliness/Adlag and reliability (Accrual Quality) respectively. At the same time, 
the p-value for TAQ and ADLAG is 0.000 and 0.1066 with an R2 of 0.179 and 0.074 respectively. Most importantly, the 
finding suggests that, financial expertise of the audit committee (FEXP) is negatively significant with the relevance of 
financial reporting. The implication of this is that the more the financial experts in the audit committee, the lower the audit 
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report lag and the more the relevance of the report to users. Our result is consistent with Carcello and Neal (2000) where 
it was found that audit committee expertise have significant negative relationship with audit fee while Ummi and Rashidah 
(2011) submitted that financial expertise may reduce audit report lag.  
With reference to reliability (TAQ) of the financial report, consistent with the priori expectation, financial expertise of 
the audit committee (FEXP) showed a negative and significant impact on reliability of financial reporting. 
 
7. Panel Least Square (LSDV) Regression Analysis 
 
Table: 4.07: Regression Results: Whole Sample 
 
 Financial Reporting Quality Measurements 
 1 2 
Independent Variables Predicted Sign 
Reliability (TAQ) Relevance (ADLAG) 
Coefficient Coefficient 
(t-statistics) (t-statistics) 
P-value P-value 
ACFEXP - 
-0.1928**
(-1.398) 
0.064 
-59.4184*** 
(-2.69) 
0.0084 
Control Variables
ACSIZE - 
-0.0274
(-0.598) 
0.551 
-0.6048 
(-0.08) 
0.937 
ACMT - 
0.1464*
(1.67) 
0.097 
0.4131 
(0.04) 
0.967 
FAGE - 
0.0406
(0.744) 
0.453 
43.833*** 
(6.609) 
0.000 
FSIZE - 
0.0127
(0.569) 
0.570 
-40.4713*** 
(-7.584) 
0.000 
AUDTYP - 
-0.1151**
(-2.180) 
0.0314 
56.7259* 
(1.89) 
0.0612 
Constant ? 
0.0181
(0.569) 
0.5703 
454.329** 
(6.11) 
0.000 
P-value
F-test 
R2 
R2 Adjusted 
No of Obs. 
 
0.0380
1.084 
0.1232 
0.0096 
123 
0.000 
7.112 
0.4796 
0.4122 
123 
Keys: ***, **, * Significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively
Note: Numbers in each cell are arranged in the following order- Coefficient, t-values (in parenthesis), P-values and Std ȕ 
 
Source: Field Survey (2014) 
 
The panel data regression for audit committee financial expertise on the quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian 
banking sector as it relates to relevance is presented in table 4.07. The R2 for relevance (ADLAG) stood at 0.4797 while 
that of reliability (TAQ) stood at 0.1232 which means that 48% of the variation in ADLAG and 12.3% in TAQ were 
explained by the model respectively. The p-values stood at 0.0000 with t-statistics of 7.112 for ADLAG and p-values of 
0.0380 with t-statistics of 1.084 for TAQ which is significant both at 1% 5% and 10% respectively. The data is balanced 
because the fixed effect model also engaged the independent variable considered in the OLS regression model.  
Therefore from table 4.07, the financial expertise (FEXP) shows a significant negative impact on the quality of 
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financial reporting (relevance). It is significant at 1% level and almost at zero level and is consistent with previous results. 
This indicates that FEXP of the audit committee member is paramount and the most crucial in ensuring the relevance of 
financial reporting in the Nigerian Banking Sector. In the same vein, the assessment of the empirical result reported in the 
table above signify that financial expertise (FEXP) of the audit committee is negatively and significantly influence the 
reliability (Accrual Quality) of financial reporting (p< 0.1). Also it has the highest coefficient which means FEXP is the 
most prominent and impactful determinant of reliability of financial reporting. This is to say that, an increase in the 
financial expertise of the audit committee would lead to a low accrual quality. This means financial expertise of the audit 
committee positively influences the reliability of financial reliability and thereby advance the quality of financial reporting in 
the Nigerian banks. The result has a t-statistics of 1.084 and a p-value of 0.06 negatively signed and its value is 
significant at 10% level of significance. 
This result was consistent with the a priori expectation indicating audit committee financial expertise as the most 
prominent and impactful determinant of preserving financial integrity and reliability of financial reporting. This confirms the 
position of regulators (e.g. Sarbanes Oxley Act, Nig. SEC Codes, 2011) and stakeholders in the financial sector across 
the world and particularly in Nigeria on the need to have financial experts in the audit committee bearing in mind the 
recent high profile fraudulent cases as observed in the Nigeria Banking Sector and across the world. The finding in this 
study with respect to audit committee financial expertise is consistent with Kalbers and Fogarty (1993); DeZoort (1997), 
(1998); BRC (1999); SOX, (2002); SEC Code, (2011) where it was proposed that the presence of financial experts in 
audit committees will assist the committee in, critically analyzing accounting policies and financial statements, identifying 
potential problems, and solving problems. 
 
8. Decision 
 
The result of the empirical analysis in table 4.06 showed that (Pooled OLS Regression of Financial Expertise (FEXP) with 
a coefficient of -12.584 and -0.036 and P-value of 0.06 and 0.07 and an overall F-statistics of 4.213 and 1.558 and p-
value of 0.0007 and 0.1066 for relevance and reliability respectively) and of the Fixed effect regression in table 4.07 
(FEXP coefficient of -59.418 and -0.192 and p-value of 0.008 and 0.064 and an overall F-statistic of 7.112 and 1.084 and 
p-value of 0.000 and 0.037 for relevance and reliability respectively), the null hypothesis which stated that Audit 
Committee Financial Expertise has no significant impact on the quality of financial reporting in the Nigerian Banking 
sector cannot be uphold and is therefore rejected. 
 
9. Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
This study examined if audit committee financial expertise is an important characteristics of financial reporting quality or a 
necessary evil. The results as demonstrated shows that, financial skills/ intelligent is critical for audit committee members 
in ensuring high quality reports. From both the OLS and LSDV reports, the financial expertise shows a consistent sign 
and coefficient in enhancing the relevance (ADLAG) and reliability (TAQ) of the financial report in the Nigerian banking 
sector. Perhaps, if the audit committee members possessed sound financial expertise, the event in 2010 that led to the 
removal of CEOs of eight banks in Nigeria would not have happened. 
The results however hint on important implication for policy makers, regulatory authorities and stakeholders on the 
need to improve on certain policies that can enhance productivity and good governance in Nigeria. For example, the 
Company and Allied Matters Act 1990 (hereafter CAMA) stipulates the composition of audit committee only in term of 
numbers without any provision to its effectiveness or how it can be productive. CAMA makes no mention about the 
financial expertise of the audit committee members which is the major factor for audit committee effectiveness. Though 
SEC and CBN Codes fairly addressed this issue of financial expertise of the audit committee, this is however not backed 
up by law. Government should therefore endeavor to incorporate audit committee governance in CAMA to become a law 
for listed firms in Nigeria. This is because SEC code in Nigeria does not mandate preparers of financial report to comply. 
It has always been like an appeal or advice for compliance without any or little attendant penalty if not adhered to.  
It is worthy to note that most of audit committee members in Nigeria as presently constituted have very low 
capacity to understand International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) based financial report which they are meant to 
provide oversight function (Ojeka, Kanu & Owolabi, 2014). Therefore, there is an urgent need to ensure that Nigerian 
audit committee members are fully equipped and fortified with financial skill and intelligent. The committee must be able 
to demonstrate capability to protect and add value to shareholders/stakeholders interests. 
This study, though with robust results and strength, have its limitations and therefore, caution should be taken in 
drawing conclusions and interpreting of the result. The limitations are considered as opportunity for further research and 
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advancing the body of knowledge especially in this area. First, the financial expertise is not separated into finance, 
accounting and supervisory expertise as few studies have done. Also, the study considered only the listed banks with 
complete financial report in Nigeria and lastly, the study made use of Ordinary Least Square and Panel Data Statistical 
techniques for the analysis. Hence, further studies could explore the decomposition of financial expertise, consider other 
sectors especially firms not listed.  
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